









Review of Chikazoe et al.
One of the main challenges of cognitive
neuroscienceistorefineexistingconcepts
and models of human behavior so that
they are grounded in and in agreement
with brain processes observed during a
particular behavior. Inhibition has been
of particular interest. In a physiological
context, inhibition refers to the causal in-
fluence exerted by region A on region B,
whereby region A decreases excitability
and output firing of region B. In contrast,
in cognitive models of behavior, inhibi-
tion is the suppression of previously acti-
vated cognitive contents or processes.
Although it has been suggested that brain
areas implement cognitive control by ex-
erting inhibitory physiological influence
over other brain areas (Aron et al., 2003),
it is still unclear to what extent inhibition
on a behavioral level can be related to
physiological mechanisms of inhibition.
Here we focus on the frontal lobe mecha-
nisms of behavioral inhibition. This type
of inhibition is a vital part of human be-
havior because it allows flexible adapta-
tion to changing environments, such as
the clearing of irrelevant action plans or
attention. It is often studied in the motor
system, because sudden cancellations of
movement plans occur frequently in ev-
eryday life and they can be easily con-
trolled in an experimental setup.
The excitability and output firing of
the primary motor cortex (M1), the area
that finally enables movements, depends
onabalanceofM1internalinhibitoryand
excitatory mechanisms, and these in turn
dependonthebehavioralcontext.Forex-
ample, M1 excitability decreases in situa-
tionswithhigheruncertaintyaboutwhich
of multiple potential actions is required
(Bestmann et al., 2008). To understand
the mechanisms of inhibitory control, we
therefore need to understand how other
areas feeding into M1, such as premotor
and prefrontal regions, influence M1 ex-
citability and output when a movement
needs to be inhibited.
Thus far, inhibition from a cognitive
perspectivehasmainlybeenstudiedusing
stop-signal tasks. Such tasks have two
typesoftrials.Ingotrials,participantsare
asked to make a speeded response to a vi-
sual cue. In no-go trials, however, the go
signal is, after a short delay, followed by a
stop signal (e.g., a tone or visual cue) in-
structingtheparticipanttowithholdtheir
response.
Studies using stop-signal paradigms
have highlighted the importance of sev-
eral frontal brain regions in the control of
responseinhibition,inparticulartheright
inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) and the pre-
supplementary motor area (pre-SMA).
Lesions to rIFG and pre-SMA interfere
with the ability to stop a planned move-
ment, and the degree of damage to the
rIFG is negatively correlated with perfor-
mance in a stop-signal task (Aron et al.,
2003; Nachev et al., 2007). Imaging stud-
iesreportedactivityinpre-SMAandrIFG
associated with stopping processes (Aron
andPoldrack,2006;Lietal.,2006).Those
participants who were better at inhibiting
responses showed more activity in rIFG
and pre-SMA and higher white matter
densityintractsconnectingrIFGwithM1
(Li et al., 2006; Forstmann et al., 2008).
Finally, repetitive transcranial magnetic
stimulation to both rIFG and pre-SMA
transiently impaired performance on go/
no-gotasks(Chambersetal.,2006).These
and other findings suggest that both rIFG
andpre-SMAplayaroleinresponseinhi-
bition. Their distinct contributions in in-
hibitorycontrolhaveonlyrecentlystarted
to become clear. It was suggested that




resolving conflict between competing ac-
tions (Aron and Poldrack, 2006; Mars et
al., 2009).
What remains unknown is how other
contextualvariablesinfluencingM1excit-
ability,suchastheuncertaintywithwhich
a movement is prepared and the likeli-
hood that the movement will need to be
inhibited, interact with inhibitory con-
trol. In studies using standard stop-signal
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fore, go responses are always associated
with some level of uncertainty, and pro-
cessesrelatedtoinhibitorycontrolandthe
resolution of conflict between different
potential actions (moving versus stop-
ping) cannot be fully separated. A recent
study by Chikazoe et al. (2009) published
in The Journal of Neuroscience therefore
used a modified stop-signal task that al-
lowed some control over the uncertainty
involved in making a go response. The
study thereby offers the opportunity to
bridgefindingsfromstudiesoninhibitory
control with concepts such as uncertainty
that are increasingly the focus of research
into decision making (Rushworth et al.,
2009).
Chikazoe et al. (2009) used a standard
stop-signal task with one novel feature:
apart from the common “uncertain” go
signals, which were as usual followed by a
stop signal in a small percentage of trials
(20%), there was also a new trial type in
which a differently colored go cue sig-
naleda“go”with100%certainty(“certain
go”), i.e., it was never followed by a stop
signal. This enabled the authors to inves-
tigatetheeffectofthecertaintywithwhich
themovementwasprepared,andthepos-
sible “precautionary” preparation of the
potential need to inhibit a response.
The difference between certain and un-
certaingotrialswasexamined(1)behavior-
ally by comparing reaction times of both
trial types and (2) by using functional mag-
netic resonance imaging (fMRI) to com-
parethebloodoxygenationlevel-dependent
(BOLD) signal in the two conditions. Brain
regionsmoreactiveforuncertaincompared
to certain go trials were identified (referred
tobytheauthorsas“preparation”contrast)
and compared to those identified in the
comparison between stop and uncertain go
trials (“inhibition” contrast). Comparisons
in the form of conjunction and disjunction
analyses between the activation patterns es-
tablished by these two initial contrasts were
also performed. Finally, the correlation be-
tween behavioral reaction times and BOLD
signals was determined.
It was found that in situations when a
go signal might be followed by a stop sig-
nal (“uncertain go”), participants re-
sponded on average 105.5 ms slower than
on certain go trials. The areas more active
foruncertaincomparedtocertaingocues
(“preparation”contrast)werethepre-SMA,
inferior frontal junction (IFJ), and insula.
Compared to uncertain go trials, a suc-
cessful inhibition was associated with
moreactivityinthepre-SMA,insula,and,
among other areas, the posterior IFG
(“inhibition” contrast). The conjunction
analysisidentifiedwhichareaswereactive
in both contrasts: pre-SMA, IFG, and in-
sula. Interestingly, only the right poste-
rior part of IFG was more active during
stop versus uncertain go but not uncer-
tain versus certain go (disjunction analy-
sis) [Chikazoe et al. (2009), their Fig. 3].
Chikazoe et al. (2009) concluded that
higher reaction times in uncertain com-
pared to certain go trials were explained
byadditionalpreparationforapotentially
necessary response inhibition in uncer-
tain go trials. Similarly, imaging findings
wereinterpretedasshowingbrainactivity
reflecting “preparation to inhibit.” It was
argued that this preparation to stop could
facilitate the neuronal processes needed
for subsequently implementing the inhi-
bition itself by recruiting the same areas.
This interpretation was supported by the
finding that subjects who showed greater
reaction time increases on uncertain go
trials were the same subjects who had less
inhibition-relatedactivity[Chikazoeetal.
(2009), their Fig. 4B]. The authors con-
cludedthatpre-SMAandIFJmightplaya
role in preparing inhibition in uncertain
go trials to then facilitate fast and more
efficient stopping in the event that a stop
cue is presented.
Chikazoe et al. (2009) introduced the
novel concept of “prepared inhibition” in
the context of stop-signal tasks, accord-
ing to which, in “uncertain go” trials, in-
hibition is prepared in anticipation of an
upcoming stop cue. Thus far in the litera-
ture, however, inhibition has mostly been
thoughtofasaprocessthathelpsonerap-
idly adjust behavior in situations when
predictions are violated. But then to pre-
pare inhibition would effectively mean
being able to predict these prediction vio-
lations. We would like to discuss some
alternative interpretations and possible
implications of this framework.
First, instead of interpreting activity in
areasreportedtobemoreactiveinuncer-
taincomparedtocertaingotrials(suchas
IFJ and pre-SMA) as preparation-related
activity, it could be explained in terms of
task switching: switching from “certain
go” to “uncertain go” would activate the
respectivetasksetrepresentations.IFJand
pre-SMA have previously been associated
with task set representation and imple-
mentation. Hence the idea that prepara-
tion to inhibit expedites inhibition could
be more intuitively explained as effects of
task switching.
Second, pre-SMA has previously been
associatedwithconflictresolutionandad-
justment of cognitive control (Mars et al.,
2009). The “preparation” contrast ana-
lyzed by Chikazoe et al. (2009) does not
rule out such an interpretation. Areas
active in uncertain compared to certain
go trials could also be responding to the
higher degree of conflict and uncer-
tainty present in these trials. Similarly,
they could respond to higher levels of
attention or the adjustment of a speed–
accuracy trade-off. All these interpreta-
tions would also explain why subjects
responded more slowly in uncertain
compared to certain go trials.
Third,itcannotberuledoutthatsome
truly inhibitory processes might also be
present in uncertain go trials, possibly to
prevent early and incautious responses.
Finally, the results of Chikazoe et al.
(2009)couldbeplacedwithinamoregen-
eral framework of a “proactive” brain,
which has been shown to explain impor-
tantaspectsofdecisionmakingandaction
selection (Rushworth et al., 2009). It sug-
gests that the brain constantly makes pre-
dictions about future events, appropriate
behavior, rewards and outcomes, and
risks, and that brain activity is largely
driven by the uncertainty related to these
predictions and by prediction violations.
Accordingtothisview,predictionsgener-
ated at higher levels on the basis of past
experiences and explicit knowledge (such
as rules) could influence lower-level pro-
cessingofsensoryinformationandmotor
output.Inthiscontext,the“uncertaingo”
trials of Chikazoe et al. (2009) might re-
cruit the network of frontal brain areas to
subsequently adjust processing in lower-
level sensory–motor circuits and to in-
hibit excitability of the motor system in a
situation with higher uncertainty. Hence
theareasrecruitedby“uncertaingo”trials
(pre-SMA, IFJ, etc.) might actually be in-
volved in the rapid updating of predic-
tionsaboutfutureinputsandappropriate
responses (i.e., the currently active task
schema).
To further explore inhibition within
such a conceptual framework, it would be
helpful to extend the authors’ novel task
design in a future study by using “uncer-
tain go” trials with varying degrees of
uncertainty (parametric modulation).
Sometimestheprobabilityofastopsignal
occurring might be 10%, at other times
20%, 30%, etc. One would expect prepa-
ration for action to decrease with increas-
ing uncertainty, while preparation to
inhibitshould(maybe)increase.Thelevel
of uncertainty could be controlled for in-
dependentofthelevelofaction/inhibition
preparation by reversing the proportion
of go/no-go trials (i.e., 80%/20% vs 20%/
NeubertandKlein•JournalClub J.Neurosci.,April7,2010 • 30(14):4830–4832 • 483180%). Preparation and uncertainty could
then be modeled separately in the fMRI
data, and their trial-by-trial fluctuations
could be related to brain activity. This
would allow testing of further predictions
about the interactions of such contextual
variables with the processes involved in
response inhibition.
In summary, the study by Chikazoe et
al. (2009) provides a platform that will
motivate further studies toward a better
understanding of the links between ac-
tioninhibitionandtheoriesofcognitive
control, decision making, and motor
planning.
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